Update: When I wrote about Tailworm, there was no fix. Now there is: Tailscale 1.104.4.
What got fixed
The flaws are in how Tailscale SSH forwards connections. The Tailscale process checked a Unix socket path, then acted on it as root, and a timing trick let an attacker swap in a different target. The attacker still needs control of a device your policy already allows to SSH to the target, with forwarding allowed in that rule. Tailscale says this doesn’t let an unauthenticated attacker reach arbitrary SSH servers, only machines the policy file already allows. The Tailscale SSH server only runs on Linux and the open-source macOS build.
What I’m doing
- Updating every node to 1.104.4 or later and checking with
tailscale version. - Keeping SSH rules tight, per my one device, one target how-to.
- Turning off forwarding in rules that don’t need it.
God Bless, and May the Source Be with You!
